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ALL IS FAIR IN DRUGS AND WAR: 
AN ANALYSIS OF “PAY-FOR-DELAY” 
AGREEMENTS AND PRODUCT HOPPING 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Close your eyes and imagine one hundred Gulfstream Four jets.  Now, 
imagine one hundred of the super car Bugatti Veyron.  Finally, imagine 
your own private island.  The amount of money that the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) estimates “pay-for-delay” agreements cost American 
consumers annually could buy all of these things.1  Twice.2 
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced as a way for generic 
drugs to enter the market before the expiration of brand-name patents, 
thereby creating competition for brand-name drugs.3  The logic was 
simple:  increased competition will lead to lower prices on an essential 
category of products.4  What Congress failed to take into account was the 
most rudimentary goal of for-profit business:  turning as high of a profit 
as possible.5 
The ultimate solution for brand-name pharmaceutical companies to 
protect their profits was to collude with the generic pharmaceutical 
companies.6  Brand-name pharmaceutical companies first began with 
direct cash payments to generic pharmaceutical companies in exchange 
for delaying the release of their product.7  Then, brand-name companies 
moved to indirect cash payments by way of conveying certain benefits.8  
Now, brand-name pharmaceuticals continue to find innovative ways to 
                                                
1 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY:  HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS (Jan. 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-
federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AL8-
FJY9] (explaining that “pay-for-delay” agreements are patent litigation settlements in which 
a brand-name pharmaceutical company pays a generic pharmaceutical company a large 
payment of some sort in exchange for delaying the generic drug’s entry into the market). 
2 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (estimating that pay-for-delay agreements 
cost consumers $3.5 billion every year). 
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (outlining filing an abbreviated new drug application 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
4 See Teresa Stanek Rea, Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price 
Competition:  Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act—An Introduction of Speakers, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 223, 224 (1999) (stating that the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to boost generic 
competition in the market). 
5 See Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Non-Profit Border, 118 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 489, 491 (2014) (showing the goal of for-profit businesses, as characterized by the 
tax code, as organizations created and operated for the purpose of making profits). 
6 See infra Part II.B (exploring the legal background of pay-for-delay agreements). 
7 See infra Section II.B.1 (reviewing pay-for-delay agreements involving direct cash 
payments). 
8 See infra Section II.B.2. 
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form pay-for-delay agreements, all to the tune of an estimated $3.5 billion 
of American consumers’ money per year.9 
The current legal scheme allowing generic pharmaceutical drugs to 
enter the market before the expiration of the brand-name patent is being 
exploited by both brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies to 
maximize their profits at the expense of consumers through pay-for-delay 
agreements.10  These agreements delay the release of generic drugs in 
exchange for some type of payment from the brand-name pharmaceutical 
company.11  In January 2010, the FTC issued a report on pay-for-delay 
agreements that found these agreements are anticompetitive and cost 
American consumers an estimated $3.5 billion each year.12 
Because brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies continue 
to make and create new ways to make anticompetitive pay-for-delay 
agreements, new amendments to legislation governing settlements 
resulting from Paragraph IV Certification of generic drugs should be 
introduced.13  These amendments would introduce caps on the term, 
benefits conveyed and cash payments included in pay-for-delay 
agreements, and impose penalties for anticompetitive behavior.14  These 
caps and penalties aim to deter and limit these settlements to facilitate the 
introduction of generic competition to the market at the earliest possible 
date while also allowing companies to conduct business and exercise their 
patent rights.15 
This Note explores pay-for-delay agreements and their negative 
impact on antitrust law.  First, Part II reviews the legal background of pay-
for-delay agreements.16  Second, Part III examines how courts have 
handled and interpreted pay-for-delay agreements.17  Finally, Part IV 
                                                
9 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2. 
10 See infra Part III (analyzing the anticompetitive nature of pay-for-delay agreements and 
the practice of product hopping). 
11 See infra Part II.B (expounding upon the legal background of pay-for-delay agreements). 
12 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2. 
13 See infra Part III.D (discussing the need to amend the current legislation governing 
Paragraph IV patent litigation); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars:  A New 
Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 499, 507 (2016) (elaborating that 
an abbreviated new drug application that is filed for Paragraph IV Certification is 
challenging the brand-name patent as invalid, that the filer’s product does not infringe upon 
the brand-name patent, or both). 
14 See infra Part IV.A (proposing new amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
15 See infra Part IV.A (stating the aims of the proposed new amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act). 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part III (analyzing cases about pay-for-delay agreements). 
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presents a prospective amendment to the current legislation that limits 
pay-for-delay agreements.18 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Part II reviews the relevant legal background of generic drug market 
entry and pay-for-delay agreements.  First, this Part examines the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984.19  Second, this Part reviews the history of pay-for-
delay agreements.20  Third, this Part delves into an empirical study of pay-
for-delay agreements.21  Finally, it explores drug product selection 
(“DPS”) laws and their role in product hopping.22 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Ratified in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted to promote more 
innovation and boost generic competition in the market.23  This legislation 
governs drug patent settlement agreements.24  One of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act’s main goals was to cut both the time and cost of the generic drug 
approval process.25  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires 
that generic drugs have the same “dosage form, safety, strength, route of 
                                                
18 See infra Part IV (advocating for an amendment to the current legislation that 
specifically deals with pay-for-delay agreements). 
19 See infra Part II.A. 
20 See infra Part II.B. 
21 See infra Part II.D (elaborating on the results of an empirical study of pay-for-delay 
agreements). 
22 See infra Part II.C (considering DPS laws and how they affect the realm of product 
hopping). 
23 See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (showing that the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to 
stimulate drug innovation while also creating a quicker route to generic approval and entry 
into the market); Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements:  The 
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2016) (denoting that the goal 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase generic competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry and foster innovation within the pharmaceutical industry); Feldman & Frondorf, 
supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance 
“adequate patent protection for pioneer inventors with promoting the rapid introduction of 
generics once this patent protection has expired”). 
24 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012) (explaining how the generic drug approval system works and 
the guidelines and steps to follow when applying for early generic entry into the market); 
Carrier, supra note 23, at 1012 (stating that the Hatch-Waxman Act governs drug patent 
settlements); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501–03 (describing how the Hatch-
Waxman Act operates). 
25 See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (expounding that one of the goals of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was to bolster the avenue for low-cost generic drugs to gain approval); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act “created a pathway to 
generic entry meant to incentivize the speedy introduction of generic drugs to market”). 
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administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use.”26  
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies experimenting to 
produce a copy of the brand-name drug were subject to infringement 
violations, which means experiments could not be conducted until after 
the patent expired.27  Included in the Hatch-Waxman Act was an 
experiment exception to patent infringement that allowed a generic drug 
company to use the patented active ingredient while experimenting to 
develop a copy of the brand-name drug.28  This exception expedites the 
process of getting new generic drugs to market after the patent for the 
brand-name drug expires because it allows generic companies to develop 
their generic version earlier.29  In addition to allowing generic drug 
companies to use the brand-name active ingredient before patent 
expiration, generic drug companies were also allowed to use the brand-
name drug’s findings for effectiveness and safety.30 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provided a new avenue for generic 
drugs to get to market prior to the expiration of the brand-name drug 
                                                
26 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WHAT ARE GENERIC DRUGS?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS. (June 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ 
QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm [https://perma.cc/U6XL-LEDY]. 
27 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, U.S. CONG., 3 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7XE-R85G] (discussing how generic companies were subject to 
infringement litigation for using a brand-name drug’s active ingredient while testing to 
develop a generic version); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1013 (reviewing how prior to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, it was considered patent infringement to use the active ingredient of a patented 
drug for the purpose of experimenting to create a new generic version of the brand-name 
drug). 
28 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (explaining that it is permissible to use patented 
inventions “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under Federal Law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products”); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 506 (stating that use 
of the active ingredient of a brand-name drug by a generic for the purposes of creating a 
generic version of that brand-name drug is not an act of patent infringement). 
29 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 27, at 3 (expressing that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
created an infringement exception that allowed generic drug manufacturers to use a 
patented active ingredient before the patent’s expiration in an effort to speed up generic 
entry into the market); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1013 (showing that with the passage of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act Congress allowed generic drug manufacturers to use the patent active 
ingredient of a drug for the purposes of experimentation with the aim of creating a generic 
version of that patented drug). 
30 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 27, at 3 (expounding that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
eliminating the duplicative testing requirements that used to be in place); Carrier, supra note 
23, at 1013 (noting that with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act Congress allowed generic 
drug manufacturers to use the findings for safety and effectiveness for the brand-name drug 
in their application for generic approval). 
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patent called an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).31  Under 
the Act, generic drug companies could challenge a brand-name drug’s 
patent in an attempt to gain early entry into the market.32  Commonly 
referred to as Paragraph IV Certification, a generic drug company could 
challenge the brand-name patent by either claiming the generic product 
does not infringe on the patent, the patent is invalid, or both.33  As an 
incentive for generic drug companies to challenge brand-name patents, 
the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the first ANDA to successfully complete 
Paragraph IV Certification a 180-day period of market exclusivity.34 
Filing for Paragraph IV Certification is regarded as a quasi-patent 
infringement.35  Due to this quasi-patent infringement presumption, 
brand-name drug companies may sue for infringement within forty-five 
days of receiving notice from the first ANDA filer.36  If a brand-name drug 
                                                
31 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (outlining the process and requirements of filing an 
abbreviated new drug application under the Hatch-Waxman Act); Carrier, supra note 23, at 
1013 (outlining how the Hatch-Waxman Act created a new route for generic approval in the 
form of the abbreviated new drug application); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501–
03 (expounding upon the process for generic certification under the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
32 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2012) (creating an option for abbreviated new drug 
applications to file for generic entry into the market before the expiration of the relevant 
patent on the grounds that “such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted . . . ”); 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (describing the process of challenging a patent 
under what is known as Paragraph IV certification); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1014 (stating a 
Paragraph IV certification was a challenge to an existing patent). 
33 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 507 (elaborating that an abbreviated new drug 
application that is filed for Paragraph IV Certification is challenging the brand-name patent 
as invalid, claiming that the filer’s product does not infringe upon the brand-name patent, 
or both); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay:  Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1565 (2006) (showing that, for a Paragraph IV 
certification to be successful, either the patent being challenged in the certification must be 
invalid or the product of the company bringing the Paragraph IV certification must not 
infringe the patent). 
34 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(aa) (2012) (defining the 180-day exclusivity period); 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 508 (talking about how the exclusivity period that is 
granted for being the first abbreviated new drug application filer is worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars and represents a large majority of the profits that can be obtained by a 
generic). 
35 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (allowing for a drug company whose patent is being 
challenge under Paragraph IV Certification to bring a patent infringement suit within forty-
five days of receiving notice of the Paragraph IV Certification challenge); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 507 (noting that filing an abbreviated new drug application for 
Paragraph IV Certification is considered “an ‘artificial’ act of patent infringement”). 
36 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (explaining that a drug company that owns a patent 
being challenged under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) is allowed to file a patent infringement 
suit within forty-five days of receiving notice of the challenge); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 
1566 (stating that patent holders often bring patent suits against companies that file for 
Paragraph IV certification). 
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company initiates an infringement suit within the allotted time period, a 
thirty-month stay of approval for the ANDA is automatically granted.37  
The stay is lifted and the ANDA may be approved by the FDA if the thirty-
month period expires, the patent is ruled invalid by the courts, or there is 
no appeal or affirmation of the judgment rendered in court.38  It is the 
litigation initiated by Paragraph IV Certification that results in pay-for-
delay agreements.39 
B. Pay-for-Delay Agreements 
Around 2005, there was a spike in drug patent litigation settlements 
involving delay to generic drug entry and compensation.40  This spike led 
to the FTC performing an investigation in 2010 in which it found “[p]ay-
for-delay agreements have significantly postponed substantial consumer 
savings from lower generic drug prices.”41  Part II.B explores the 
progression of pay-for-delay agreements.  First, it examines pay-for-delay 
agreements involving direct cash payments through the lens of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.42  Second, it explores pay-
for-delay agreements involving indirect cash payments by looking at the 
                                                
37 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (discussing that, if a patent owner files a patent 
infringement suit within forty-five days of receiving notice of a Paragraph IV Certification 
challenge, a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is put into place and is active beginning on 
the date that the notice was received); Mark S. Levy, Comment, Big Pharma Monopoly:  Why 
Consumers Keep Landing on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 260 
(2016) (describing how, upon a patent holder filing a patent infringement suit in response to 
a Paragraph IV challenge, an automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval for the generic 
drug involved in the suit is put into place). 
38 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (expounding that the stay expires either after thirty 
months or at an earlier or later date that has been determined by the court); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 509 (elaborating that FDA approval of the generic drug can only 
occur either at the end of the thirty-month stay or by court order resulting from the patent 
infringement suit that arose from the original Paragraph IV certification); Jennifer E. Sturiale, 
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review:  A New Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L. 
REV. 59, 72–73 (2017) (observing that a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is placed on the 
ANDA as soon as a patent holder files for patent litigation in response to the application and 
can be lifted by resolution of thirty months or a finding by the court that the patent being 
challenged is either invalid or not infringed). 
39 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 3 (detailing how pay-for-delay agreements 
appear in the settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical companies); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (surmising that the 
rise of Paragraph IV certification in turn gave rise to the pay-for-delay strategy, which 
became a tool of choice for brand-name pharmaceutical companies).   
40 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1 (showing that, because of misapplication of 
antitrust law by some appellate-level courts in 2005, pay-for-delay agreements saw a spike 
in number). 
41 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2. 
42 See infra Section II.B.1. 
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First Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust 
Litigation.43  Finally, it considers pay-for-delay agreements and the 
practice of product hopping.44 
1. Pay-for-Delay Agreements Involving Direct Cash Payments 
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act provided generic drug companies a 
way to enter the market prior to the expiration of a patent, brand-name 
drug companies felt the sting where it hurt the most:  their wallets.45  The 
easiest way for the brand-name drug companies to preserve their profits 
was to share some portion of those profits with the generic drug 
companies in exchange for the promise not to enter the market for a certain 
period of time.46  Justice Breyer explained direct cash payment pay-for-
delay agreements best in his opinion for FTC v. Actavis, Inc. saying: 
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement.  
The two companies settle under terms that require 
(1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the 
patented product until the patent's term expires, and 
(2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of 
dollars.  Because the settlement requires the patentee to 
pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way 
around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called 
a “reverse payment” settlement agreement.47 
                                                
43 See infra Section II.B.2. 
44 See infra Section II.B.3. 
45 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (noticing that the introduction of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act put a large amount of brand-name drug companies’ profits at risk by 
allowing generic competition to enter the market sooner than it had ever been allowed to 
before); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 77 (stating that a Paragraph IV certification challenge to a 
blockbuster drug is a tremendous financial risk to the brand-name pharmaceutical 
company). 
46 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (outlining how, facing the prospect of 
possibly losing out on a substantial portion of profits, brand-name drug companies resorted 
to the practice of pay-for-delay agreements); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1014 (2010) 
(expounding upon the intricacies of pay-for-delay agreements, otherwise known as “reverse 
payments”); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1568 (explaining the basic structure of pay-for-delay 
agreements where a patent holder pays the generic challenger in exchange for the generic 
challenger delaying entry into the market); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 76 (noting the large 
incentive for brand-name pharmaceutical companies to settle Paragraph IV patent litigation, 
including the preservation of the enormous amount of resources expended in developing the 
drug, the amount of time spent researching the drug, and the difficulty of achieving FDA 
approval for new, original drugs). 
47 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
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By flipping the script on the traditional notion of a settlement, brand-name 
drug companies found a solution to their generic competition problem 
that not only worked for them but also for the generic drug companies.48  
Congress attempted to dissuade these types of agreements by introducing 
the Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 that, among other things, 
amended the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide that any first ANDA filer that 
agrees to a pay-for-delay agreement would forfeit their 180-day period of 
market exclusivity.49  The Medicare Modernization Act did not do much 
to curb the amount of pay-for-delay agreements, however, as the study 
conducted by the FTC shows that a rise in such agreements occurred in 
2005, two years after the introduction of the amendment.50 
Finally, in 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., a case involving a pay-for-delay agreement.51  In 2003, 
Actavis (known as Watson Pharmaceuticals at the time) filed an ANDA 
along with two other generic drug companies for a generic drug based on 
AndroGel, a drug produced by the brand-name drug company Solvay 
                                                
48 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 510 (describing pay-for-delay agreements as 
“an ingenious approach in which the brand-name drug company shares a portion of its 
monopoly profits with the generic company in exchange for the generic company agreeing 
to stay out of the market”); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1568 (“Innovators faced with generic 
competition have shown considerable ingenuity in maximizing the returns from a successful 
drug.”); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 77–78 (stating that generic pharmaceutical companies are 
incentivized to settle Paragraph IV patent litigation by the large sums of money offered by 
the brand-name pharmaceutical companies and the elimination of risk associated with 
patent litigation); Sturiale, supra note 38, at 77 (observing that brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies are incentivized to settle Paragraph IV patent certification to preserve the amount 
of time and resources expended to develop the brand-name drug). 
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2012).  One of the forfeiture events described in the 
Medicare Modernization Act that amended the Hatch-Waxman Act occurs when: 
[t]he first applicant enters into an agreement with . . . an owner of the 
patent that is the subject of the certification under paragraph 
(2)(A)(vii)(IV), the Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General 
files a complaint, and there is a final decision of the Federal Trade 
Commission or the court with regard to the complaint from which no 
appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari) has been or can be taken that the agreement has violated the 
antitrust laws.  
Id. 
50 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1 (denoting a spike in the number of pay-for-
delay agreements starting in 2005 and increasing over the next four years into 2009). 
51 See generally Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227–30 (outlining the basic pay-for-delay 
agreement and discussing the Court’s decision to hear the case).  See also Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513 (showing that the Supreme Court granted certiorari for F.T.C. 
v. Actavis, Inc. in order to rule on the antitrust implications of pay-for-delay agreements); 
Levy, supra note 37, at 254 (displaying that the Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled 
on pay-for-delay agreements in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc.). 
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Pharmaceuticals.52  Upon receiving notice of the filing, Solvay initiated a 
patent infringement suit against Actavis and the other filers, which 
triggered the automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval.53  While 
patent litigation was ongoing, the automatic stay expired and the ANDAs 
that were first filed received their approval from the FDA.54  Then, in 2006, 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals settled the patent litigation with Actavis and the 
other filers.55  The terms of the settlement dictated that Actavis promised 
not to enter the market for AndroGel until 2015 and also promised to 
promote the brand-name product for Solvay in exchange for what was 
estimated to be somewhere between $19–30 million dollars annually for 
the next nine years.56  The FTC filed a lawsuit against the settling parties 
in 2009 and lost both in district and appellate court before being granted 
certiorari.57 
The Court in Actavis, Inc. had two objectives while writing its opinion:  
determining whether pay-for-delay agreements could be challenged and, 
if so, whether they violate antitrust law.58  The Court stated that 
inappropriate use of monopoly powers granted by a patent was invalid.59  
Because these agreements prevent competition from entering the market, 
execution of these agreements could potentially be an inappropriate use 
                                                
52 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (explaining that Actavis had filed an abbreviated new 
drug application for AndroGel, a Solvay product, in 2003); Joseph Fielding, From Pay-For-
Delay to Product Hopping:  The Limited Utility of Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1928 (2017) (observing that Actavis and the other defendants filed 
Paragraph IV ANDAs in 2003). 
53 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013) (stating that Solvay commenced 
Paragraph IV patent litigation with Actavis in response to Actavis filing an abbreviated new 
drug application concerning a patent Solvay owned for AndroGel); Fielding, supra note 52, 
at 1928 (showing that, in response to the Paragraph IV ANDAs filed, Solvay initiated a patent 
infringement suit). 
54 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (expounding that thirty months after Solvay initiated 
patent litigation the FDA approved the first filed abbreviated new drug applications for 
AndroGel); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1928 (articulating that a thirty-month stay of FDA 
approval was put into place when the patent litigation was initiated). 
55 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (presenting that, even though the first filing 
abbreviated new drug applications received FDA approval, the patent litigation started by 
Solvay concerning those same applications was settled by all parties); Fielding, supra note 52, 
at 1928 (specifying that Actavis and the other filers decided to forgo the 180-exclusivity 
period to settle with Solvay instead). 
56 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
57 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2229–30. 
58 Compare Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (stating that the appellate court viewed pay-for-
delay agreements as generally immune from antitrust law, but the Supreme Court 
disagreed), with F.T.C. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012) (surmising that 
pay-for-delay agreements are generally immune from antitrust law). 
59 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (discussing the Court’s holding in 
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), pertaining to the interaction between 
patent law and antitrust law). 
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of patent powers under antitrust law.60  Thus, their validity can be 
challenged in court.61  Moving on to the anticompetitive effects of the 
agreement, the Court found that the large sum paid in exchange for 
delaying the release of the generic drug was likely forbidden by antitrust 
law.62  At the beginning of its analysis, the Court decided that the rule of 
reason test was proper and laid out five factors to apply when looking at 
the anticompetitive nature of pay-for-delay agreements.63  During its 
analysis, the Court stated that companies with the power to pay “large 
sums” in exchange for not entering the market are those with “higher-
than-competitive profits.”64  It held that the agreements that raise 
suspicion are those that exceed the estimated cost of the patent litigation 
and involve a highly profitable party because only those companies with 
such power are equipped to execute an anticompetitive pay-for-delay 
                                                
60 See id. at 2227 (saying the alleged agreement could at times violate antitrust law); 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513 (recounting that, while the Supreme Court stopped 
short of declaring reverse payment settlements, the Court held that reverse payment 
settlements may be anticompetitive and are open to antitrust scrutiny); Sturiale, supra note 
38, at 64 (voicing that the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. held that reverse payment 
settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation could sometimes be 
anticompetitive and in violation of antitrust law); Francisco Javier Espinosa, Big Pharma 
Versus Inter Partes Review:  Why the Pharmaceutical Industry Should Seek Logical Hatch-Waxman 
Reform Over Inter Partes Review Exemption, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 356 (2017) (expressing 
that the Supreme Court held that reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV 
patent litigation could at times be in violation of antitrust law and, as such, should be subject 
to antitrust scrutiny). 
61 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (showing that the appellate court was applying 
the incorrect test when it affirmed); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1931 (delineating how the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Circuit was incorrect in applying a scope of patent 
test to analyze reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation 
because Paragraph IV patent litigation is challenging validity of the patent, and, if the parties 
do not settle and the court finds the patent invalid, the patent in question would have no 
scope or, if the court did not find infringement, stalling generic competition from entering 
the market would be beyond the scope of the patent in question). 
62 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (stating that if the basic reason for the agreements is 
to preserve and share patent-generated profit, they likely violate antitrust law); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513 (elaborating that the Supreme Court held that pay-for-delay 
agreements are vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny). 
63 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32; Fielding, supra note 52, at 1933 (specifying that the 
Supreme Court, in lieu of a bright line rule, laid out five separate factors that should be used 
in a rule of reason analysis when examining reverse payment settlements that arise out of 
Paragraph IV patent litigation); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 513–14 (voicing that 
the Supreme Court decided on a rule of reason analysis instead of a quick look analysis when 
deciding FTC v. Actavis, Inc.). 
64 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (explaining that firms can pay “large sums” to 
decrease competition and entice generics to stay “out of their market”); Fielding, supra note 
52, at 1931 (elucidating that Solvay, if the patent was valid and infringed, would have the 
ability to make “higher-than-competitive” profits, which suggests that Solvay had the ability 
to make the type of payment that the Supreme Court held could potentially be violating 
antitrust law). 
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agreement.65  At the end of its opinion, the Court remanded the case and 
instructed the lower courts to structure a rule of reason test for the issue.66  
Because this was the first time the Supreme Court had ruled on this issue 
of law, it was inevitable that more suits would follow requiring further 
interpretation of the Actavis, Inc. decision.67 
2. Pay-for-Delay Agreements Involving Indirect Cash Payments 
After Actavis, Inc. was decided, a new kind of pay-for-delay 
agreement arose in which a benefit, instead of cash, was conveyed to the 
generic challenger.68  It did not take long for these new payments to be 
challenged in court.69  Mainly, the goal was to determine whether this kind 
of pay-for-delay agreement fell under the power of Actavis, Inc.70  
                                                
65 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (surmising that pay-for-delay 
agreements become unjustified when they convey a payment that surpassed the estimated 
cost of the Paragraph IV patent litigation the settlement resulted from); Fielding, supra note 
52, at 1932 (specifying that large payments from brand-name pharmaceutical companies to 
generic pharmaceutical companies can be used as evidence of the settlement’s 
anticompetitive nature). 
66 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (remanding and instructing the lower courts to 
structure a new rule of reason test); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 514 (recounting 
that the Supreme Court, while holding that a rule of reason analysis was the correct vehicle 
to examine reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation, left 
the structuring of the rule of reason analysis to the lower courts upon remand); Edward D. 
Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 57 (expressing that 
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. held that a rule of reason analysis was the correct 
way of examining reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent 
litigation, and the lower courts are to structure the rule of reason analysis consistent with 
their opinion). 
67 See generally King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 
393 (3d Cir. 2015) (expounding that the Third Circuit was asked to consider whether Actavis 
should be extended to settlement agreements that result from Paragraph IV patent litigation 
that do not involve a direct cash payment); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 
542 (1st Cir. 2016) (considering whether or not to extend Actavis to settlement agreements 
that result from Paragraph IV patent litigation that do not “involve reverse payments in pure 
cash form”). 
68 See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393 (discussing a pay-for-delay agreement 
in which the brand-name pharmaceutical company promised not to make an authorized 
generic in exchange for delay); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 517 (elaborating on 
pay-for-delay agreements that include benefits such as the right to manufacture an 
authorized generic). 
69 See generally King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393–413 (outlining a case against 
a brand-name pharmaceutical company for its pay-for-delay agreement that involved not 
producing an authorized generic in exchange for delay); In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 541–42 
(specifying a case in which a generic agreed to delay the entry of its drug in exchange for a 
promise from the patent holder not to release an authorized generic upon the generic’s entry 
to the market). 
70 See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393 (stating that the court is to determine 
whether a pay-for-delay agreement that conveys benefits as opposed to cash is covered by 
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Eventually, the court in In re Loestrin 24 decided to extend Actavis, Inc. to 
pay-for-delay agreements involving an indirect cash payment.71 
On February 17, 2006, the FDA approved Warner Chilcott’s New 
Drug Application (“NDA”) for an oral contraceptive dosing regimen 
named Loestrin 24.72  A few months after gaining FDA-approval, Warner 
received notice that Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. had filed a Paragraph 
IV Certification ANDA for a generic version of Loestrin 24.73  Warner then 
filed an infringement suit against Watson, triggering the thirty-month 
automatic stay.74  Before the stay expired in January 2009, Warner and 
Watson reached a settlement agreement in which Warner agreed, among 
other things,75 to grant Watson a license to produce a generic Loestrin 24 
and not to grant any other company such a license until at least 180 days 
after Watson came to market in exchange for Watson delaying its entry 
into the market until January 22, 2014.76  Half a year after Warner and 
Watson made their deal, Warner received notice that Lupin 
Pharmaceuticals filed a Paragraph IV Certification ANDA for a generic 
version of Loestrin.77  Warner sued Lupin for patent infringement in 2009, 
and the two companies settled in 2010.78  In the settlement, Warner agreed 
to grant Lupin licenses to market the generic version of two different 
drugs not related to Loestrin 24 in exchange for Lupin delaying its entry 
into the Loestrin 24 market until July 22, 2014, or after the period of 
                                                
Actavis); In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 542 (expressing that the issue at hand was whether or 
not the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. extended to reverse payment 
settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation where the reverse payment was 
not a pure cash payment). 
71 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 542. 
72 See id. at 545. 
73 See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 545 (1st Cir. 2016). 
74 See id. at 546 (denoting that Warner filed for Paragraph IV patent litigation, which 
triggered the automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval for abbreviated new drug 
application).  See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (stating that, if a patent owner files a 
patent infringement suit with forty-five days of receiving notice of a Paragraph IV 
Certification challenge, a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is put into place and is active 
beginning on the date that the notice was received); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1566 
(showing that patent holders often bring patent suits against the generic companies that file 
for Paragraph IV certification). 
75 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 538, 546 (specifying that Warner also agreed to pay 
Watson “annual fees and a percentage of net sales” from Watson's co-promotion of Femring 
and “the exclusive right to earn brand sales” for the Warner product Generess Fe). 
76 See id. at 546. 
77 See id. (expounding that Lupin Pharmaceuticals sent notice that it had filed an 
abbreviated new drug application to market a generic version of Loestrin 24 on July 30, 2009). 
78 See id. at 547.  See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012) (describing that if a patent owner 
files a patent infringement suit, a thirty-month stay of FDA approval is put into place and is 
active beginning on the date that the notice was received); Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1566. 
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exclusivity Warner had previously negotiated with Watson had expired.79  
Following the two agreements, a class of Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs and 
End Payor Plaintiffs filed antitrust claims against the parties of both 
agreements.80 
The court’s objective in In re Loestrin was to determine whether Actavis 
extended to non-cash payments.81  Whereas the district court concluded 
that Actavis, Inc. only applied to agreements in which cash was paid, the 
circuit court disagreed.82  The circuit court instead decided that Actavis, 
Inc. should be read to include non-cash payments, noting the Third 
Circuit’s decision in King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.83  
Using the Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “payment,” the court 
reasoned that payment was a broad category that included the giving of 
money or something else of value.84  Logically, the court then concluded 
that Actavis, Inc. covered non-cash payments because these payments 
conveyed something of value from one party to another.85  The court 
stated that for a pay-for-delay agreement to violate antitrust law, the 
brand-name pharmaceutical company must make a “large and 
unjustifiable” payment to the generic pharmaceutical company.86  The 
                                                
79 See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 547 (1st Cir. 2016) (showing that 
Lupin agreed to delay the entry of its generic version of Loestrin 24 in exchange for the 
licenses to market Femcon Fe and the generic version of Asacol). 
80 See id. at 542 (expounding that two putative classes of plaintiffs filed antitrust claims 
against the agreements between Warner, Watson, and Lupin). 
81 See id. at 549.  See also F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (explaining that 
cash payment pay-for-delay agreements could violate antitrust law but did not rule on pay-
for-delay agreements that convey a benefit); Samuel N. Weinstein, Rigged Results?  Antitrust 
Lessons from Keyword Auctions, 91 TUL. L. REV. 629, 688 (2017) (elucidating that the lower court 
was deciding whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis applied to non-cash forms of 
payment involved in reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent 
litigation). 
82 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 542; Weinstein, supra note 81, at 688 (voicing that the 
First Circuit disagreed with and vacated the district court’s decision that Actavis only applied 
to pure cash payments). 
83 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (noting how other circuits have held that Actavis 
applies to non-cash payments); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 
791 F.3d 388, 406 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing how the patent holder leverages power to create 
an anticompetitive effect); Weinstein, supra note 81, at 688 (expressing that both circuits held 
that the Supreme Court’s Actavis holding does in fact apply to non-cash forms of payment 
involved in reverse payment settlements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation). 
84 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550. 
85 See id. (elaborating how non-cash payments were covered by Actavis even though the 
Supreme Court refers directly to monetary payments); Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[I]n 
substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of 
its market.”). 
86 In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 552 (1st Cir. 2016).  See also Actavis, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (explaining that “[A] reverse payment, where large and unjustified, 
can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects . . . ”); Fielding, supra note 52, 
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court reasoned that the plaintiff did not need to provide precise statistics 
of the payment for various reasons.87  It required that the plaintiff allege 
facts that could support that the agreement was large and unjustifiable but 
did not define what kind of facts would qualify as providing that kind of 
support.88  The court vacated the judgment of the lower court and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with their opinion.89 
3. Pay-for-Delay Agreements and Product Hopping 
After the Actavis, Inc. and In re Loestrin decisions, it became clear that 
both brand-name companies involved in each decision were now 
exposing themselves to potential legal liability by entering into pay-for-
delay agreements.90  This potential legal liability prompted brand-name 
drug companies to move toward the practice known as product 
hopping.91  The practice of product hopping starts with reformulating a 
drug with a patent that is about to expire to produce a slightly newer 
version of the drug that can receive a new patent.92  Once the 
                                                
at 1932 (specifying that large payments from brand-name pharmaceutical companies to 
generic pharmaceutical companies can be used as evidence of the settlement’s 
anticompetitive nature). 
87 The type of evidence that the plaintiff would need to make out the precise figures of a 
large and unjustifiable payment is more than likely going to be in the exclusive possession 
of the defendant.  In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 552 (“[V]ery precise and particularized 
estimates of fair value and anticipated litigation costs may require evidence in the exclusive 
possession of the defendants, as well as expert analysis.”). 
88 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 552 (outlining that a plaintiff must still allege enough 
facts to show that, as a matter of law, the payment is large and unjustifiable).  But see also id. 
(showing that, while the court required the plaintiff to allege facts to show that a payment 
was large and unjustifiable, it failed to define what kind of facts would provide support for 
such an allegation). 
89 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 553. 
90 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (finding that settlement 
agreements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation could sometimes violate antitrust 
law); In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (choosing to extend Actavis to include indirect cash 
payments involved with settlement agreements resulting from Paragraph IV patent 
litigation). 
91 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(discussing Actavis PLC’s anticompetitive “forced-switch scheme” and how it would “likely 
impede generic competition”); In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 253 (D. Mass. 
2017) (stating that the plaintiffs alleged that defendants were involved in “an anticompetitive 
scheme that included product hopping that constituted monopolization”); Carrier, supra 
note 23, at 1010–11 (explaining that pharmaceutical companies engage in the practice of 
product hopping). 
92 There are three different types of reformulation that are employed during the practice 
of product hopping.  Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–17.  First, the drug manufacturer can 
change the form from the original (such as tablets or capsules) to another different form.  Id.  
Second, the drug manufacturer can add or remove molecular compounds to create a new 
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reformulation is complete and a patent is obtained, the brand-name drug 
company can perform either a hard switch or a soft switch.93  A hard 
switch occurs when a brand-name drug company introduces a new 
version of a drug and subsequently pulls the old version of the drug off 
the shelf completely or restricts access to the old drug once the new 
version of the drug has entered the market.94  A soft switch occurs when a 
brand-name drug company introduces and markets a new version of a 
drug but keeps the old version of the drug on the market.95  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to address product 
hopping.96 
In New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, Actavis was the 
producer of the drugs Namenda IR and Namenda XR.97  With strong 
generic competition eminent in the IR market, Actavis created and 
brought Namenda XR to market two years prior to the tentative generic 
entry date.98  While both the IR and XR version of Namenda were available 
                                                
composition.  Id.  Third, a drug manufacturer can produce a composite drug by combining 
two or more existing, separate drugs into one.  Id. 
93 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (considering the differences between soft and hard 
switches); In re Asacol, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 256–58 (expounding upon the anticompetitive hard 
switch being alleged); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–22 (exploring the process and market 
entry timing associated with the practice of product hopping); Fielding, supra note 52, at 
1934–35 (outlining how Forest Laboratories, a subsidiary of Actavis, performed both a soft 
switch, in which it used aggressive marketing to convince consumers to switch from 
Namenda IR to Namenda XR, and a hard switch, in which Forest Laboratories restricted 
access to the IR version of the drug). 
94 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (noting the definition of a hard switch); In re Asacol, 233 
F. Supp. 3d at 256–58 (reviewing the alleged anticompetitive hard switch from Asacol to 
Delzicol); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934–35 (denoting how Forest Laboratories executed a 
hard switch tactic involving Namenda IR and XR by restricting access to the older Namenda 
IR when the patent for Namenda IR was about to expire because Namenda XR had patent 
rights through 2029). 
95 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (exploring the definition of a soft switch); In re Asacol, 
233 F. Supp. 3d at 269 (expounding upon what constitutes a soft switch and why it is not 
anticompetitive); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934–35 (outlining Forest Laboratories soft switch 
strategy with Namenda IR and Namenda XR, which consisted of aggressive marketing 
aimed at convincing consumers to switch from Namenda IR to Namenda XR). 
96 See Kieran Meagher, Note, Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act:  Mylan’s Ability to Monopolize 
Reflects Major Weaknesses, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 589, 605 (2017). 
97 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(presenting that Actavis was the producer of the drugs Namenda XR and Namenda IR); 
Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934 (denoting that Forest Laboratories, a subsidiary of Actavis, 
was the producer of Namenda IR and Namenda XR). 
98 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646–47 (showing that Actavis created and began to market 
Namenda XR two years before the entry date of generic competition); Levy, supra note 37, at 
278 (explaining that the patent holder created a new version of Namenda in an attempt to 
avoid the impending patent cliff); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1934 (articulating that Forest 
Laboratories, a subsidiary of Actavis, began aggressively marketing Namenda XR in 2013, 
which is two years prior to the expiration of Namenda IR’s patent). 
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at the time of Namenda XR’s market entry, Actavis stopped actively 
marketing Namenda IR upon Namenda XR’s entry.99  Actavis also 
employed a myriad of tactics to induce patients currently taking Namenda 
IR to switch to Namenda XR.100  After performing these strategies, Actavis 
decided to completely remove Namenda IR from the market.101  While 
Actavis was in the process of pulling Namenda IR from the market, the 
state of New York filed suit against Actavis alleging that the planned 
withdrawal of Namenda IR from the market constituted a hard switch and 
was in violation of antitrust law.102 
The court in Actavis PLC was attempting to determine the 
anticompetitive nature of the practice of product hopping.103  The Actavis 
PLC court used existing case law when determining the test for measuring 
the anticompetitiveness of product hopping.104  The court determined that 
for product hopping to be unlawfully anticompetitive it must both coerce 
consumers and impede competition.105  When detailing what would 
constitute coercing consumers and impeding competition, the court stated 
that both occur “when a monopolist combines product withdrawal with 
some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce consumers 
rather than persuade them on the merits and to impede competition.”106  
The court determined that Actavis’s withdrawal of Namenda IR from the 
                                                
99 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (stating that Actavis stopped actively marketing the IR 
version of Namenda when initially began to offer the XR version of Namenda); Fielding, 
supra note 52, at 1934. 
100 First, Actavis spent considerable amounts of money to promote Namenda XR to 
doctors, pharmacists, caregivers, etc.  Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 638.  Second, Actavis sold 
Namenda XR at a discounted rate, making it more affordable than the previous Namenda 
IR.  Id.  Third, Actavis issued rebates to health care providers for Namenda XR in an attempt 
to persuade them to push for more prescriptions of the drug.  Id. 
101 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (presenting that on February 14, 2014, Actavis 
announced that it was discontinuing the IR version of Namenda on August 15, 2014); Levy, 
supra note 37, at 278; Fielding, supra note 52, at 1935 (elaborating that, once Namenda XR 
entered the market, Forest Laboratories began restricting access to Namenda IR). 
102 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 649; Fielding, supra note 52, at 1935 (showing that New York 
alleged that Actavis, through their Forest Laboratories subsidiary, was liable for antitrust 
violations because of the hard switch tactics employed during Namenda XR’s introduction 
to the market that restricted access to Namenda IR with the intention of pulling the drug off 
the market). 
103 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 642–43 (describing the scheme used by Actavis PLC that 
was alleged by New York to be an anticompetitive product hopping scheme); Fielding, supra 
note 52, at 1936 (denoting that the central issue of the case was whether or not Forest 
Laboratories was intentionally attempting to maintain monopoly power in the U.S. 
memantine drug market by way of a product hopping scheme). 
104 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015). 
105 See id. 
106 Id. at 654. 
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market was anticompetitive and granted the state of New York a 
preliminary injunction against its withdrawal.107 
The resulting fallout of Actavis PLC includes the case In re Asacol 
Antitrust Litigation.  The court in In re Asacol found that Warner Chilcott’s 
conduct with the products Asacol, Asacol HD, and Delzicol was not 
anticompetitive because it was not a hard switch.108  The court said that 
because the hard switch was directed at Delzicol and because Asacol and 
Asacol HD were both available at the same time there could not be a hard 
switch from Asacol.109 
C. Drug Product Selection Laws 
By 1984, all states had adopted some form of drug product selection 
(“DPS”) laws.110  These types of laws allow pharmacists to substitute 
pricier brand-name medication with a cheaper generic equivalent.111  One 
reason DPS laws were enacted in the states was so pharmacists would 
have more incentive than doctors to pick the cheaper generic drug and 
save consumers money.112  The FTC found: 
                                                
107 See id. at 663 (affirming the district court’s order granting the state of New York a 
preliminary injunction against the removal of Namenda IR from its respective market); Levy, 
supra note 37, at 278 (expounding that the Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction 
originally issued by the district court); Fielding, supra note 52, at 1936 (showing that the 
Second Circuit agreed with the state that the hard switch tactics used by Forest Laboratories 
in conjunction with the release of Namenda XR constituted an intentional attempt to 
maintain monopoly power under a product hopping scheme and enjoined Actavis from 
pulling Namenda IR off of the market prior to the expiration of its patent in 2015). 
108 See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 268 (D. Mass. 2017). 
109 See id. 
110 See MASSON & STEINER, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES:  
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (Oct. 
1985), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-substitution-
prescription-drug-prices-economic-effects-state-drug-product-selection-laws/ 
massonsteiner.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MGY-ZPJ4] (denoting that by mid-1984 all states had 
enacted some form of drug product selection law). 
111 See id. at 1 (explaining that drug product selection laws allow pharmacists to substitute 
generic equivalents for brand-name drugs in certain cases); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1017 
(elaborating on how laws allow pharmacists to substitute brand-name medication for 
generic); Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Legislation Related to Biologic Medications and 
Substitution of Biosimilars, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURE (June 1, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/Biologics_BiosimilarsNCSLReport2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GXV4-Y86P] (exploring state laws that denote when generic medication 
can be substituted for brand-name medication by pharmacists). 
112 See MASSON & STEINER, supra note 110, at 1 (“The premise underlying DPS laws is that 
the pharmacist has a greater incentive than the physician to identify the cheapest source of 
supply and to pass along at least part of the savings to the consumer.”); Carrier, supra note 
23, at 1017–18 (stating that pharmacists must respond with consumer demand in order to 
compete in the pharmacy industry). 
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Physicians' behavior reveals not only a marked 
preference for prescribing brand-name drugs but also for 
specifying the first brand marketed in a drug entity.  In 
the absence of substitution, this proclivity towards 
prescribing the pioneer brand in effect extends the drug's 
dominance even after the expiration of the patent which 
conferred the initial legal monopoly.113 
Prior to DPS laws, physicians were the ones who made the decision of 
which medication a patient would receive.114  If the physician prescribed 
a brand-name medication, the pharmacist would provide that medication, 
even if there was a cheaper generic equivalent available.115 
DPS laws seek to transfer to the pharmacists some of the power to 
decide which medications consumers will pay for.116  There are two 
reasons behind this rationale.117  First, the amount of different choices in 
pharmacies creates competitive prescription prices, which means 
pharmacists must respond to consumer demand in order to compete for 
business.118  Second, there is an incentive to fill prescriptions with generic 
medication because pharmacies typically gross more money on generic 
medication.119  Congress surmised that the combination of these factors 
and the authority to fill brand-name prescriptions with a generic 
equivalent would increase consumer savings.120 
D. The Empirical Values of Pay-for-Delay Agreements 
Having an interest in the economic impacts of pay-for-delay 
agreements, Ruben Jacobo-Rubio, John L. Turner, and Johnathon W. 
Williams performed an empirical study to analyze two different values 
associated with Paragraph IV patent litigation pay-for-delay 
agreements.121  First, the study investigates value of deterrence for brand-
                                                
113 MASSON & STEINER, supra note 110, at 6. 
114 See id. at 5. 
115 See id. at 6 (expressing that without the option of substitution consumers do not get to 
exercise choice when choosing medication). 
116 See id. at 7. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. (discussing how drug product selection laws take advantage of pharmacists’ 
increased incentive to fill prescriptions with generic equivalents to offer savings to 
consumers). 
121 See Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., The Distribution of Surplus in the US Pharmaceutical 
Industry:  Evidence from Paragraph (iv) Patent Litigation Decisions 2 (Jan. 21, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
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name pharmaceutical companies.122  Second, the researchers determine 
the value of entry for generic pharmaceutical companies.123  Third, the 
study explores the relationship between the values of deterrence and entry 
and drug sales.124  Finally, the authors review the implications that the 
2002 decision in Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C. had on pay-for-delay 
agreements.125 
The phrase value of deterrence refers to the potential value gained, 
expressed in United States Dollars (USD), by brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies for deterring and restricting competition.126  By using 
particular economic equations, the authors determined a dispute value.127  
In other words, the estimated dispute value for brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies represents the value of deterrence.128  Using 
their specific economic equations, the authors were able to determine that 
the average value of deterrence for brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies is $4.6 billion.129 
The phrase value of entry is the other side of value of deterrence’s 
coin.  Value of entry is used to define the potential value gained, expressed 
in USD, by generic pharmaceutical companies for gaining entry into a 
market via Paragraph IV Certification.130  Similar to value of deterrence, 
the dispute value for generic pharmaceutical companies represents the 
value of entry.131  The differences between the two values is derived from 
the difference in value of the variables that are input into the authors’ 
economic equations.132  Again, using their economic equations, the 
                                                
2481908 [https://perma.cc/7ABT-MQ46] (elaborating on the empirical study performed to 
analyze values associated with pay-for-delay agreements). 
122 See id. at 3. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. at 4. 
125 See id. 
126 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 22–29  (reviewing the meaning of the phrase value 
of deterrence). 
127 See id. at 12 (outlining the two economic equations used to determine dispute value, in 
which the value of deterrence uses the equation VWinB - VLossB and the value of entry uses the 
equation VWinG - VLossG). 
128 See id. at 29 (implying that when a dispute value is calculated using the variables of 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies, the resulting dispute value is value of deterrence). 
129 See id. (stating that when the proper variables are input into the equation VWinB - VLossB, 
the resulting average value of deterrence for brand-name pharmaceutical companies was 
$4.6 billion). 
130 See id. at 30 (explaining that the value of entry means the oligopolistic profit that could 
be realized through patent litigation).  
131 See id. at 29. 
132 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 43 (displaying a table that denotes these 
differences). 
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authors were able to determine that the average value of entry for generic 
pharmaceutical companies was $236.8 million.133 
Although the difference in the size between brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical companies plays its part, the staggering monetary 
difference between the values of deterrence and entry reveals what the 
authors refer to as a “strong asymmetric” relationship.134  The average 
value of entry only makes up 5.1% of the average value of deterrence.135  
When viewing the relationship between the values through the context of 
drug sales, a one-dollar increase in sales for a drug increases the value of 
deterrence by $7.19.136  When subjected to the same scenario stated in the 
previous sentence, the value of entry only increases by $0.19.137 
In Schering-Plough, two drug manufacturers sued the FTC in the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn an FTC order to cease and 
desist settlements in patent litigation.138  The court sided with the drug 
manufacturers and overturned the order, which legitimized the use of 
settlements in patent litigation.139  The authors of the study reviewed the 
differences in value of deterrence and value of entry both prior to and after 
Schering-Plough.140  They found that the value of deterrence dropped from 
$8.8 billion prior to Schering-Plough to $3.5 billion after Schering-Plough, 
and the value of entry dropped from $532 million to $173.5 million.141  The 
authors also observed that the drop in the values of deterrence and entry 
after Schering-Plough occurred in spite of the fact that drug sales were 
nearly double during this period.142  This observation led the authors to 
suggest that the average level of competition in the pharmaceutical market 
has dropped since the decision in Schering-Plough.143 
                                                
133 See id. at 29 (elaborating that when the correct variables are used for the equation VWinG 
- VLossG, the resulting average value of entry for generic pharmaceutical companies was 
$236.8 million). 
134 See id. (noting the highly-skewed nature of the relationship between the value of 
deterrence and the value of entry). 
135 See id. at 29 (noticing that the average value of entry of $236.8 million only comprises 
5.1% of the average value of deterrence of $4.6 billion). 
136 See id. at 31 (“A one-dollar increase in a drug’s sales is associated with a $7.19 increase 
in brand-firm stakes.”). 
137 See id. (“A one-dollar increase in a drug’s sales is associated with a $0.19 increase in 
generic-firm stakes.”). 
138 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005). 
139 See id. at 1073–76 (explaining that the FTC order unreasonably restrains trade and must 
be overturned). 
140 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 32–33 (exploring the economic impacts of the court’s 
decision in Schering-Plough). 
141 See id. at 33. 
142 See id. at 32. 
143 See id. at 4. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Part III analyzes how various courts have dealt with pay-for-delay 
agreements.  First, cash payment pay-for-delay agreements are analyzed 
through the lens of the decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.144  Second, the Note 
looks at In re Loestrin Fe Antitrust Litigation to analyze non-cash payment 
pay-for-delay agreements.145  Third, the practice of “product hopping” 
and its impact on pay-for-delay agreements are examined through 
analyzing New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC.146  Fourth, it 
reviews the implications of the empirical economic impact of pay-for-
delay agreements.147  Finally, the Note explores the need to amend the 
current legislation to include specific language pertaining to pay-for-delay 
agreements.148 
A. Effectiveness of FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 
Part III.A looks at the effectiveness of the Actavis decision by 
examining the agreements the Court examined, the clarity of the language 
the Court used, the test the Court used, and the fallout from the decision 
rendered.149 
While the Court dealt with agreements in which cash is directly paid 
from one party to another, it did not look at other potential payment 
methods that could be undertaken to complete pay-for-delay 
agreements.150  Not examining other payment methods left a gap in the 
doctrine governing pay-for-delay cases, but it is possible that the Court 
intended to leave this analysis to the lower courts.151  The decision is 
ineffective because it is clear that lower courts cannot agree on how to deal 
with this issue, which suggests that remanding without further direction 
                                                
144 See infra Part III.A (examining the effectiveness of FTC v. Actavis, Inc.). 
145 See infra Part III.B. 
146 See infra Part III.C (looking at the practice of product hopping). 
147 See infra Part III.D. 
148 See infra Part III.E. 
149 See infra Part III.A. 
150 See generally F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (showing that pay-for-delay 
agreements not involving direct cash payments are not discussed in the opinion); In re 
Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 549 (1st Cir. 2016) (describing that the court is 
looking at whether to extend Actavis to non-cash payments, which shows that pay-for-delay 
agreements not involving direct cash payments were not considered by the Supreme Court 
in Actavis). 
151 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (discussing how the Court is tasking the lower courts 
with structuring the test that is to be further applied to this issue); Feldman & Frondorf, supra 
note 13, at 514 (noting that the Supreme Court left the structuring of the test to the lower 
courts). 
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could lead to another circuit split.152  If there are more circuit splits, it is 
very likely that the issue will get petitioned to the Supreme Court again 
because a circuit split is the reason the Court originally heard the case.153  
This circular pattern is a public policy concern because the issue of pay-
for-delay agreements continues to take up time and resources in the court 
system without being resolved.154  Although only looking at cash payment 
agreements could lead to more circuit splits, the clarity of the language 
used in the opinion could also contribute to another split.155 
The decision’s effectiveness erodes when looking at the Court’s 
analysis of which pay-for-delay agreements violate antitrust laws, which 
vaguely referred to other justifications as reason for the payment.156  The 
Court continued to reference vague, broad terms such as “large sum” and 
“higher-than-competitive profits” when it discussed market power.157  
Yet, the Court did not explicitly define “large sum” or “higher-than-
competitive profits” in its opinion.158  By using this vague language and 
                                                
152 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (explaining that the lower courts have reached 
different conclusions on the application of antitrust law to pay-for-delay agreements); 
Hemphill, supra note 33, at 1557 (denoting that some federal appellate courts have permitted 
pay-for-delay settlements, while some federal appellate courts have not permitted pay-for-
delay agreements). 
153 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (stating that the reason the Court granted certiorari 
was because there was a split in the circuit courts as to how to apply antitrust law to 
settlement agreements that result from Paragraph IV patent litigation).  Compare In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(affirming the Eastern District of New York decision to grant a motion to dismiss state 
antitrust claims involving a patent settlement), and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 
466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the lower court that the defendant’s 
conduct involving a patent settlement did not violate antitrust law), with In re K–Dur 
Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012) (outlining the court’s decision to 
agree with the FTC in saying that pay-for-delay agreements in drug patent litigation are 
inherently anticompetitive and, therefore, are presumptively in violation of antitrust law). 
154 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012) (explaining that the first factor that the Supreme Court of the 
United States takes into consideration when reviewing a writ of certiorari is whether there is 
a circuit split on the issue, which implies that there should be a concerted effort to avoid 
circuit splits); Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. Ga. 2014) 
(presenting that one must follow court rules to attempt to conserve court resources); Kirsten 
Z. Myers, Removing the Mass Misperception:  A Consideration of Environmental Torts and Removal 
Jurisdiction Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 182 (2016) (specifying 
that circuit splits are not favored because they’re inconsistent and confusing).  
155 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (displaying the Court’s referencing broad and vague 
terms when discussing the decision’s specifics and failure to define them); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 514 (expressing that the Supreme Court held that “large and 
unjustified” reverse payments are anticompetitive, but the Court does not explain what is 
large and unjustified). 
156 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (expounding that there may be 
other justifications for the reverse payment such as avoiding court costs and other expenses). 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
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remanding back down to the lower courts, the Court made it entirely 
possible for circuits to interpret those terms differently, and another 
circuit split could result.159  More circuit splits means more time and 
resources are taken out of the court system, which is a public policy 
concern.160   
Also, the vagueness of the language used by the Court could make it 
difficult for plaintiffs to file a complaint that could survive a motion for 
summary judgment.161  Complaints could struggle to survive the motion 
because, if the terms that define what must be shown in a complaint are 
broad and vague, then establishing a genuine dispute that can be 
supported by admissible evidence will be very difficult.162  If surviving a 
motion for summary judgment is difficult, plaintiffs will likely be deterred 
and will possibly not bring suit due to the high cost that litigation usually 
incurs.163  If plaintiffs do not bring suit to challenge anticompetitive pay-
for-delay agreements and the current statutory scheme stays in place, this 
anticompetitive practice will go unchecked, and pharmaceutical 
companies will be allowed to continue to profit off of consumers by 
keeping the cost of medication high.164  The Court’s ineffectiveness in 
providing clarity to its vague language harms application of the test it set 
up.165 
                                                
159 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012) (elaborating that a circuit split occurs when “a United States 
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States 
court of appeals on the same important matter”). 
160 See id. (articulating that one of the first factors that the Supreme Court considers when 
reviewing a writ of certiorari is whether there was a circuit split on the matter, which 
suggests that circuit splits ought to be avoided).  See also Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, 
Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. Ga. 2014) (specifying that one must follow court rules to attempt 
to conserve court resources); Myers, supra note 154, at 182 (noting that circuit splits are 
disfavored because of their inconsistency in application and they confuse prospective 
plaintiffs);  
161 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (stating that one must support a motion to dismiss by 
showing that the records cited to “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact”). 
162 See id. (expressing that, to support a motion to dismiss, one has to show that the other 
party either cannot establish a genuine dispute, produce admissible evidence to support the 
alleged claims, or both, which implicitly means that a complaint must prove a genuine 
dispute that can be supported with admissible evidence to survive a motion for summary 
judgment).  
163 See Jarod Bona, How Much Does It Cost to Litigate An Antitrust Case?, ANTITRUST ATT’Y 
BLOG (June 5, 2014), https://www.theantitrustattorney.com/2014/06/05/much-cost-
litigate-antitrust-case/ [ https://perma.cc/ZKX5-AZJT] (detailing the steps and various 
costs involved with each step of antitrust litigation). 
164 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (estimating that pay-for-delay agreements 
cost consumers $3.5 billion every year). 
165 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231–32 (2013) (explaining the factors of the 
test set up by the Supreme Court). 
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While the Court was ineffective when defining the moving parts 
involved in this issue, it was also ineffective when setting up its rule of 
reason test.166  By running a five-factor analysis and then instructing the 
lower courts to structure a new test, it is possible that the new tests created 
by the circuit courts could affect, and even go against, the analysis 
performed in the opinion.167  Because each circuit court could create a 
different test, this instruction has opened up another avenue toward a 
circuit split, which is a public policy concern.168  Inevitably, the decision in 
Actavis, Inc. has created a large fallout.169 
The fallout and ineffectiveness from the Actavis, Inc. decision gave rise 
to a new kind of pay-for-delay agreement that opted for conveying a 
benefit as opposed to cash as payment for delaying generic entrance into 
the market by taking advantage of some of the gaps left by the Actavis, Inc. 
decision.170 
B. Effectiveness of In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation  
The decision in In re Loestrin was effective, in part because it produced 
congruence among the circuits.171  The court’s decision in In re Loestrin not 
                                                
166 See id. at 2231–32. 
167 See id. (discussing the factors by which to analyze antitrust impact); id. at 2238 (leaving 
the lower courts to determine a new rule of reason test). 
168 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012) (articulating that the Supreme Court considers circuit splits 
when reviewing a writ of certiorari, which suggests that circuit splits ought to be avoided).  
See also Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. Ga. 2014); Myers, supra 
note 154, at 182. 
169 See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 550 (1st Cir. 2016) (considering 
whether Actavis extends to indirect cash payments involved in settlement agreements 
resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline 
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 2015) (exploring if Actavis extends to indirect cash 
payments involved in pay-for-delay agreements); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis 
PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015) (showing how the Actavis PLC employed the 
practice of product hopping with its drug Namenda to manipulate the market at the 
expiration of the patent for the drug). 
170 See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 393 (discussing the effects of Actavis on 
pay-for-delay agreements that do not involve direct cash payments).  Compare Actavis, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. at 2223–38 (showing that pay-for-delay agreements not involving direct cash 
payments are not discussed in the opinion), with King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 93 
(explaining how the patentee drug manufacturer agreed not to make an authorized generic 
that would compete with the generic company’s product in exchange for a delay). 
171 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (noting how Actavis has been extended to include 
non-cash payments by King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. in the Third 
Circuit); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d at 413 (ruling that Actavis covers pay-for-
delay agreements that involve indirect cash payments); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation, 
94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 243 (D. Conn. 2015) (elucidating that it is the large and unjustified 
transferring of value from patent holder to alleged infringer that produces an 
anticompetitive agreement); United Food and Com. Workers Loc. 1776 & Participating 
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only brought the First Circuit in line with the Third Circuit but also 
aligned with a growing trend among courts throughout the country.172  By 
aligning itself with the other courts around the country, the court in In re 
Loestrin avoided the potential pitfall of another circuit split.173  Avoiding 
another circuit split is important because it follows the public policy of 
avoiding bogging down the court system with circular lawsuits by 
bringing clarity as to how to determine which agreements are 
anticompetitive.174 
The court’s decision in In re Loestrin was also effective in clarifying the 
language of the Actavis, Inc. opinion as it pertained to non-cash 
payments.175  It effectively noted how the term “payment,” which has a 
broad meaning, was a key term used repeatedly throughout the Supreme 
Court’s Actavis, Inc. opinion.176  This clarification is important for ensuring 
that a complaint will survive a motion for summary judgement, which 
would encourage affected consumers to bring suit, and thus, deter 
pharmaceutical companies from using pay-for-delay agreements for fear 
of lawsuits.177  Although the court was effective in clarifying the language 
of the Actavis, Inc. opinion, it left an important piece of language in the 
opinion ambiguous.178 
                                                
Emp’rs Health & Welfare Fund, et al. v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., et al., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 
1069–70 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denoting that value can be measure in several different ways); Time 
Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, 52 F. Supp. 3d 705, 710 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (finding that agreements 
involving non-cash forms of payment are under the purview of the Actavis decision). 
172 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550–51 (showing that other various courts around the 
country had decided to extend Actavis to include non-cash payments); In re Aggrenox, 94 F. 
Supp. 3d at 243 (explaining that it is the large and unjustified transferring of value from the 
brand-name drug company to the generic company that qualifies as a reverse payment); 
United Food and Com. Workers Local 1776, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1069–70 (holding that there are 
several different ways to determine value outside of monetary means); Time Ins. Co., 52 F. 
Supp. 3d at 710 (presenting that anticompetitive agreements under Actavis could take other 
forms besides a direct cash payment). 
173 See supra Part III.A (discussing the resulting fallout of the Actavis, Inc. decision, 
including another possible circuit split). 
174 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Hernandez, 297 F.R.D. at 540; Myers, supra note 154, at 182. 
175 See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 550 (1st Cir. 2016) (specifying the 
breadth of the key terms used by the Supreme Court in its Actavis decision). 
176 See id. (stating that the term “payment” was not only a key term used in the Actavis 
opinion but also a term that suggests a broader category). 
177 A motion to dismiss must show the complaint does not “establish the absence or 
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence 
to support the fact.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B).  The requirements for establishing a motion 
to dismiss mean that, implicitly, it is important for the party filing the complaint to 
understand clearly what must be alleged in the complaint.  Id.  The court’s clarification of the 
term “payment” established an element of what a party had to allege in the complaint to 
establish a genuine dispute.  In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 
178 See In re Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550 (explaining that the court purposely did not define 
the terms “large” and “unjustifiable”). 
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Because the court did not define what type of figures would be 
necessary for proving a payment was large and unjustifiable, it has 
purposely, inefficiently added vagueness to the kind of facts a plaintiff 
must allege to show that a payment was large and unjustifiable.179  The 
court not specifying what constitutes a large and unjustifiable payment 
could potentially make it harder for a plaintiff to file a lawsuit that could 
survive a motion for summary judgment.180  As discussed in the previous 
section, if it is difficult to survive a motion for summary judgment, it is 
likely that high litigation costs will put off many would-be plaintiffs.181 
While these inefficiencies could potentially affect future litigation 
involving pay-for-delay agreements, pharmaceutical companies switched 
to product hopping in a display of their adaptability.182  This practice was 
favored because it circumvented the various court rulings that some pay-
for-delay agreements violate antitrust law by not involving pay-for-delay 
agreements to attack the generic market.183  The next part of this Note 
analyzes the opinion in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC to 
examine the practice of product hopping and how it has influenced pay-
for-delay agreements.184 
C. Effectiveness of New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC 
When ruling on New York’s challenge that product hopping was 
anticompetitive in nature under antitrust law, the court was effective 
when it clarified what qualifies as anticompetitive behavior when making 
                                                
179 The court determined that defining “large” and “unjustifiable” would place an 
unrealistic burden at the pleading stage on prospective plaintiffs wishing to bring suit.  In re 
Loestrin 24, 814 F.3d at 550.  While the court’s rationale is logical on its face, it conflicts with 
the standards of surviving a motion to dismiss outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 
180 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (stating that must support a motion to dismiss by showing 
that the records cited “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that 
an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact”). 
181 See supra Section III.A.1 (looking at direct cash payment pay-for-delay agreements).  See 
also Bona, supra note 163 (detailing the steps and various costs involved with each step of 
antitrust litigation). 
182 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(showing that the plaintiff alleged that the case involved the defendant practicing product 
hopping); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–17 (defining the process of product hopping and 
how pharmaceutical companies use the practice to avoid imminent patent cliffs). 
183 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 642–43 (discussing how Actavis PLC used a substitution 
strategy with its drug Namenda to manipulate the market at the expiration of the patent for 
the drug); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1016–17 (specifying how companies use product hopping 
instead of pay-for-delay agreements due to the litigation problems that surround pay-for-
delay agreements following FTC v. Actavis and its progeny). 
184 See infra Part III.C. 
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allegations in a complaint but hand-cuffed the courts by making its ruling 
too narrow and easily avoidable.185 
The court in Actavis PLC used a clear, concise definition of what is 
sufficient to allege unlawfully anticompetitive product hopping.186  This 
clear and concise definition is very helpful for plaintiffs writing a 
complaint to initiate a lawsuit and survive a motion for summary 
judgment.187  Because of high litigation costs, the easier and more likely a 
complaint is to succeed, the more likely plaintiffs are to bring suits when 
anticompetitive behavior is discovered.188  Thus, more successful suits 
alleging pay-for-delay agreements or product hopping would deter 
anticompetitive practices, save consumer access to generic drug prices, 
and prevent a competitive market from being negotiated out of the 
industry.189 
While the court was clear in defining its test for determining product 
hopping’s anticompetitive nature, it diminished its effectiveness when it 
narrowed its use too much by determining that only hard switches could 
be considered coercive.190  Although the court reasoned that a soft switch 
did not rise to the level of coercion, failing to rule that a soft switch could 
be anticompetitive unnecessarily constricted the test.191  It is possible that 
a pharmaceutical company could perform a hard switch by prefacing it 
with a soft switch to give the illusion that the company allowed consumers 
freedom of choice while switching between the drugs.192  By performing 
                                                
185 See discussion infra notes 186–93 and accompanying text. 
186 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 654 (stating that a plaintiff must show allege “a monopolist 
combines product withdrawal with some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce 
consumers rather than persuade them on the merits . . . and to impede competition”); id. 
(finding that only hard switches were anticompetitive while soft switches were permissible). 
187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (explaining that the plaintiff must support a motion to 
dismiss by showing that the records cited to “do not establish the absence or presence of a 
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 
the fact”). 
188 See Bona, supra note 163 (detailing the steps and various costs involved with each step 
of antitrust litigation). 
189 Contra Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33 (suggesting that the legitimization of 
settlements in patent litigation encouraged pharmaceutical companies to settle and caused a 
lowering of the average level of competition in the pharmaceutical market). 
190 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(describing how Actavis PLC went about withdrawing Namenda off the market and 
deeming it to be what is known as a hard switch); Levy, supra note 37, at 278 (showing that 
the Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction because of the hard-switch that 
occurred with Namenda). 
191 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 655 (reasoning that a soft switch leaves both the old and 
new product available, but not recognizing that a soft switch can be used to veil a hard 
switch, which was ruled by the court to be anticompetitive and against antitrust law). 
192 See id. (reasoning that, because a soft switch leaves both the old and new product on the 
market while the switch is occurring, soft switches allow consumers freedom of choice based 
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this maneuver, brand-name drug companies have found a loophole to 
circumvent antitrust scrutiny by dressing their hard switch up with a soft 
switch.193  
Because of the competitiveness distinction made in Actavis PLC 
between soft and hard switches, Warner Chilcott successfully prefaced a 
hard switch with a soft switch to enable a product hop, as was discussed 
in the previous paragraph.194  The fact that anticompetitive product 
hopping is still occurring shows that the distinction between hard and soft 
switches made by Actavis PLC has been ineffective.195  Because the lineage 
of cases governing pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping have 
been ineffective overall, there is a need for specific regulation governing 
pay-for-delay agreements.196 
D. Pay-for-Delay:  Economic Impact 
When looking at the empirical study on pay-for-delay agreements 
performed by Ruben Jacobo-Rubio et al., there are several instances that 
would suggest the current patent litigation climate is encouraging 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements.197  First, the drastic difference 
in value gained for settling patent litigation provides proper motivation 
for both sides to reach an anticompetitive settlement.198  Second, the 
difference in dispute value added by an increase in a drug’s sales shows 
that the stratification between the value of deterrence and the value of 
entry only continues to grow.199  Finally, the authors’ suggestion that the 
                                                
on merits); id. at 648 (outlining that a hard switch is when a pharmaceutical company 
completely withdraws a drug all at once while introducing a new replacement into the 
market at the same time); id. at 655 (defining a soft switch as introducing the new drug to the 
market with the old drug still being available while the pharmaceutical company slowly 
switches over to the new drug). 
193 See In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 268–69 (D. Mass. 2017) (finding that 
there could not have been an anticompetitive hard switch because Asacol, Asacol HD, and 
Delzicol were all available prior to the switch). 
194 See id. at 268 (stating that the hard switch was between Asacol and Delzicol); id. (noting 
that Asacol and Asacol HD were both on the market at the same time so it could not be a 
hard switch, implicitly deeming this to be a soft switch); id. at 267–68 (determining plaintiffs 
did not have a product hopping claim pertaining to Asacol HD). 
195 See id. at 267–68 (showing that Warner Chilcott was able to successfully perform a 
product hopping while circumventing the Actavis PLC decision). 
196 See infra Part III.D. 
197 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 5 (discussing how, in general, the findings of the 
study suggest that the lower average competition in the pharmaceutical market has dropped 
while drug sales have nearly doubled). 
198 See id. at 29 (examining the difference between the value of deterrence and the value of 
entry). 
199 See id. at 31 (exploring the difference in the value of deterrence added and the value of 
entry added when one adds a single dollar to a drug’s sales). 
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trends between pre- and post-Schering-Plough imply that competition has 
lowered on average since the decision lays bare pay-for-delay agreements’ 
opposition to public policy.200 
The gap between the value of deterrence and the value of entry is quite 
large, with the value of entry making only 5.1% of the value of 
deterrence.201  This gap suggests that not only are brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies extremely interested in settling patent 
litigation to restrict and deter competition but also generic pharmaceutical 
companies are extremely motivated to do the same in order to ensure they 
realize whatever kind of return on investment the generic companies can 
get.202  If both brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies are 
extremely interested in settling patent litigation, it follows that the most 
likely outcome of patent litigation is a settlement.203  This result goes 
directly against the stated public policy goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and antitrust law, which aims to stimulate generic competition in the 
pharmaceutical market, because the current system motivates brand-
name and generic pharmaceutical companies to form an agreement that 
delays generic entry into the pharmaceutical market.204  The important 
                                                
200 See id. at 33 (noting how, while average dispute values have dropped 60% since the 
decision in Schering-Plough, average drug sales have almost doubled, which implies that the 
competition in the pharmaceutical market has been lowered since Schering-Plough); Ruth 
Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benefit 
Management Industry:  A Proposed Exception to the Copperweld Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 
313 (1996) (denoting that one of the public policy aims of antitrust law is to prevent 
anticompetitive business behavior).  
201 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 29 (elaborating on the fact that the average value of 
entry, $236.8 million, comprises only 5.1% of the average value of deterrence, $4.6 billion). 
202 See id. (reviewing how winning patent litigation is worth far more to the brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies than it is to generic pharmaceutical companies); Tahk, supra note 
5, at 491 (explaining that the goal of a for-profit business is to make profits). 
203 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33 (suggesting that the cause for the 60% brand-
name win rate at the district court level could be explained by a growing trend of weak 
patents settling litigation more often than strong patents); Tahk, supra note 5, at 491 
(specifying that creation of profits is the goal of a for-profit business). 
204 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 29 (stating that the average value of entry, $236.8 
million, only made up a small percentage of the average value of deterrence, $4.6 billion, 
which suggests that brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies are motivated to 
settle); Tahk, supra note 5, at 491 (exploring the fact that for-profit businesses operate for the 
sake of making profits); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (showing that the goal of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was to stimulate generic competition in the pharmaceutical market); Feldman & 
Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was 
to balance drug innovation with generic market entry); Timm, supra note 200, at 313 
(expounding that antitrust laws seek to prevent anticompetitive business behavior within 
economic markets). 
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implication of this opposition to public policy is that the cost of the 
elimination of competition is passed on to the consumers.205 
While the large difference between the value of deterrence and the 
value of entry shows the motivation of brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical companies to settle, viewing these values through the 
context of drug sales reveals that every new dollar of drug sales is 
widening the gap between the values and thus strengthening the 
motivations of each party.206  With every new dollar in a drug’s sales, the 
value of deterrence increases by $7.19 and the value of entry increases by 
$0.19.207  This discrepancy between the increase in the value of deterrence 
and the increase of the value of entry means that every new dollar of a 
drug’s sales is 378% more valuable to brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies, which suggests every new dollar in a drug’s sales increases 
the motivation of brand-name pharmaceutical companies to restrict and 
deter competition.208  Logically, this discrepancy means that every time 
drug sales increase, the motivation of brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies to restrict and deter competition increases, which goes against 
the public policy goals outlined in the Hatch-Waxman Act.209 
Considering the gap between the value of deterrence and the value of 
entry, the authors examined the data before and after the decision in 
Schering-Plough and found that both values dramatically decreased after 
the decision even though drug sales had nearly doubled.210  The decrease 
in both values led the authors to suggest that settlements in patent 
litigation lower the average level of competition in the pharmaceutical 
market.211  This decrease of value in the face of mounting drug sales that 
has resulted in lower average competition is yet another example of how 
settlements of patent litigation tend to directly oppose the public policy of 
                                                
205 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that the FTC estimated that pay-for-
delay agreements cost consumers $3.5 billion every year); Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33 
(specifying that the pay-for-delay agreements have been associated with a drop in the 
bargaining surplus from $4.9 billion to $1.3 billion, or a drop of 73%). 
206 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 31 (reviewing the large difference between the 
average value of deterrence added and the average value of entry added when one dollar is 
added to the average drug sales). 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (stating that the intended goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was to increase avenues for generic competition into the pharmaceutical market in an 
attempt to increase competition); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (expounding 
upon the fact that balancing drug innovation with quick generic market entry for the purpose 
of creating competition was the main goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
210 See Jacobo-Rubio, supra note 121, at 33. 
211 See id. at 4 (exploring how the average level of competition was depressed in the period 
after Schering-Plough, which suggests that pay-for-delay agreements have lowered the 
average level of competition in the pharmaceutical market). 
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increasing generic competition in the pharmaceutical market.212  The 
findings of the Jacobo-Rubio study show that settlements of patent 
litigation are harming generic competition in the pharmaceutical market, 
which suggests that there is a need to legislate this issue specifically.213 
E. Pay-for-Delay:  The Need for Legislation 
The brand-name and generic drug companies’ willingness to game 
the system at each step shows the need for stricter regulation of pay-for-
delay agreements and product hopping.214  The study performed by the 
FTC estimated that pay-for-delay agreements cost consumers $3.5 billion 
per year.215  With a couple of months of monopoly profits worth hundreds 
of millions of dollars, there is incentive for brand-name drug companies 
to continue their anticompetitive behavior and utilize the tools made 
available to them.216 
The practice of product hopping is particularly effective when 
considering the practice along with DPS laws.217  If a product hop is 
successful, a brand-name company will have effectively extended its 
patent monopoly while also eliminating the possibility of generic 
competition for an extended period of time.218  Because the new product 
                                                
212 See id. at 29 (suggesting that the dramatic drop in both the average values of deterrence 
and entry suggests that pay-for-delay agreements have lowered the average level of 
competition in the pharmaceutical market); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (discussing that the goal 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase generic competition entry in the pharmaceutical 
market); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main goal of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance drug innovation with generic market entry). 
213 See infra Part III.E (investigating the need for legislation that specifically regulates pay-
for-delay agreements and product hopping). 
214 See supra Part III.A (exploring the holes and exploitations in Actavis, Inc.); supra Part III.B 
(examining how courts dealt with indirect cash payment pay-for-delay agreements); supra 
Part III.C (considering the practice of product hopping); supra Part III.D (reviewing the 
economic impact of pay-for-delay agreements). 
215 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2. 
216 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 503 (stating that just a few months of 
monopoly profits could net hundreds of millions of dollars); Tahk, supra note 5, at 491 
(explaining that the purpose of organizing and operating a for-profit business is to make 
profits); Lacie Glover, Here are the Top Selling Drugs in the US, TIME (June 26, 2015), 
http://time.com/money/3938166/top-selling-drugs-sovaldi-abilify-humira/?xid=soc_ 
socialflow_twitter_money%20 [https://perma.cc/GY3J-JU3Z] (showing the top drug 
earners for the year 2014 with Sovaldi making $658 million per month, Abilify making $655 
million per month, and Humira making $600 million per month). 
217 See supra Part II.D (elucidating DPS law and function, and how product hopping can 
potentially take advantage of this area of law). 
218 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(specifying that Actavis PLC’s planned withdrawal of Namenda IR would create “a 
‘dangerous probability’ that Defendants would maintain their monopoly power after 
generics enter the market”). 
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will enjoy patent exclusivity for a period of time, the generic market will 
lag behind, and pharmacists will not have generic medications they can 
substitute for the new brand-name medication.219  This lack of generic 
medications available for substitution means that there is no cheaper 
alternative to compete with the brand-name medication and provide 
balance to the marketplace.220 
At their core, both pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping 
contrast with the public policy reasons that drive the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.221  One of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s main goals is to provide generic 
competition to the brand-name pharmaceutical industry by providing 
avenues for generic competitors to enter the market.222  Because the 
purpose of pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping is to delay or 
prevent generic competitors from entering the market, these practices are 
operating in direct opposition to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s public policy 
goals.223  The opposition between industry and public policy generated by 
                                                
219 See id. at 661 (saying that generics cannot just move into the new market for the new 
brand-name drug because the companies must restart the FDA approval process over again); 
Carrier, supra note 23, at 1018 (explaining that product hopping drags down competition 
because it circumvents DPS laws). 
220 See MASSON & STEINER, supra note 110, at 1 (conveying that drug product selection laws 
allow pharmacists to substitute generic equivalents for brand-name drugs in certain cases). 
221 See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (showing that stimulating drug innovation while also 
creating a quicker route to generic approval and entry into the market was the public policy 
goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Carrier, supra note 23, at 1012 (denoting that the public 
policy reasons behind the Hatch-Waxman Act were to increase generic competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry and foster innovation within the pharmaceutical industry); 
Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (articulating that the main public policy goal 
driving the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance “adequate patent protection for pioneer 
inventors with promoting the rapid introduction of generics once this patent protection has 
expired”). 
222 See Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (expounding that a public policy goal of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was to provide new avenues for low-cost generic drugs to gain approval and entry to 
the market); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 501 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
“created a pathway to generic entry meant to incentivize the speedy introduction of generic 
drugs to market”). 
223 See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (elaborating that pay-for-delay 
agreements are arrangements where a patent-holding party enjoying exclusivity in the 
market pays a competitor to delay entry into that market for the purpose of preserving the 
patent-holding party’s current exclusivity); Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648 (considering the 
differences between soft and hard switches that are utilized in product hopping); In re Asacol 
Antitrust Litig., 233 F. Supp. 3d 247, 256–58 (D. Mass. 2017) (reviewing the 
anticompetitiveness of hard switches involved in product hopping); Carrier, supra note 23, 
at 1016–22 (exploring the process and market entry timing associated with product hopping, 
rendering the practice anticompetitive); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (explaining that drug 
innovation growth and creation of quicker routes to generic approval and entry into the 
market were among the public policy goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
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holes in the legislation warrants amendments that both modify existing 
language within and add new language to the Hatch-Waxman Act.224 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The continual use of pay-for-delay agreements and the practice of 
product hopping shows the need for amendments to current legislation.225  
First, this part of the Note proposes amendments to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act to limit and deter pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping.226  
Second, it considers commentary and counterarguments against the 
proposal.227 
A. Proposed Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
The Hatch-Waxman Act does not do enough to limit and deter 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements.228  First, Section IV.A.1 
proposes an amendment to the language of the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
include the implementation of a cap system that restricts the terms of pay-
for-delay agreements.229  Second, Section IV.A.2 proposes penalties in the 
form of increased Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rates.230 
                                                
224 See infra Part IV.A (proposing amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act that are aimed at 
deterring and limiting pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping).  See also Jacobo-
Rubio, supra note 121, at 33 (noting how average dispute values have dropped 60% since the 
decision in Schering-Plough and average drug sales have almost doubled, which suggests the 
competition level in the pharmaceutical market has been lowered since the decision); Timm, 
supra note 200, at 313 (specifying that one of the public policy aims of antitrust law is to 
prevent anticompetitive business behavior); Rea, supra note 4, at 224 (saying that creating a 
quick avenue to generic approval and entry into the market while maintaining innovation in 
the drug market was the public policy goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act); Carrier, supra note 
23, at 1012 (observing the public policy reasons driving the Hatch-Waxman Act were to 
stimulate generic competition in the pharmaceutical market and foster innovation within the 
pharmaceutical market); Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 13, at 502 (expounding that the 
main public policy goal driving the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance “adequate patent 
protection for pioneer inventors with promoting the rapid introduction of generics once this 
patent protection has expired”). 
225 See supra Part III.D (discussing the need to amend current legislation to combat the 
current issues that are being experienced due to pay-for-delay agreements and the practice 
of product hopping). 
226 See infra Part IV.A. 
227 See infra Part IV.B. 
228 See supra Part III.D (noting the need to amend current legislation governing pay-for-
delay agreements and product hopping). 
229 See infra Section IV.A.1. 
230 See infra Section IV.A.2 (explaining the proposed penalty of increased rebate rates 
involved with the Medicaid Rebate Drug Program).  See also CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & 
MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM, MEDICAID.GOV (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-
program/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q73G-S6Q8] (stating that the Medicaid Drug 
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1. Regulatory Cap System 
The Hatch-Waxman Act should be amended to restrict the terms of 
pay-for-delay agreements.231  The restrictions should include a cap on the 
length of the delay and the amount of value, both direct and indirect, the 
agreement can convey.232  The language that would be added to the statute 
would read as follows: 
 
Purpose:  The purpose of this amendment is to put restrictions 
upon the length and amount of value conveyed in agreements 
that delay the entry of generic pharmaceuticals. 
 
(a) Definitions 
(1) Independent Third Party.  An individual, appointed 
by the court, with an expertise in estimating the entire cost 
of legal litigation. 
(b) If a settlement agreement is reached during patent 
litigation involving generic entry under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(2)(A)(iv), the terms of said agreement must adhere to 
the following: 
(1) the agreement may not delay the entry of the ANDA 
filer’s generic equivalent past the thirty-month stay of 
FDA approval triggered at the filing of the litigation; and 
(2) the value conveyed from one party to another cannot 
exceed the entire estimated cost of the litigation as 
determined by an independent third party.233 
                                                
Rebate Program is a government program through which drug companies enter into a 
national rebate agreement with the government “in exchange for state Medicaid coverage of 
most of the manufacturer’s drugs”); id. (showing that innovator drugs must pay 23.1% of the 
Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) as a rebate and non-innovator drugs must pay 13% of 
AMP as a rebate); id. (denoting that the maximum rebate amount for innovator drugs is 
100%); 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 27:22 MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM (2017) (saying 
that in order for drug manufacturers to receive payments from Medicaid, they must enter 
into national rebate agreements with the government for medication given out through state 
Medicaid). 
231 See supra Part III (exploring how a lack of clarity about what constitutes a large, 
unjustified payment suggests that limits should be set on pay-for-delay agreements). 
232 See supra Part III (expressing how both the amount of money and length of delay to 
generic market entry are the central issues surrounding the anticompetitive nature of the 
settlement agreement). 
 
233 The length restriction being set at thirty months was chosen to align with the earliest 
date of FDA approval of the abbreviated new drug application to ensure that the new generic 
equivalent can enter the market at the earliest possible date.  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012).  
The value restriction was chosen because it aligns with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Actavis, 
Inc. that says that settlement agreements resulting from Paragraph IV patent litigation rise 
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2. Penalties Via Increased Medicaid Drug Rebate Program Rates 
The Hatch-Waxman Act should also be amended to include penalties 
in the form of increased Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rates.234  If the 
penalties proposed are incurred, the rebate rate of the said innovator drug 
involved, if any, will be increased, and the rebate rate of any authorized 
generic of the drug by the offender will be increased.235  The amendment 
to the Act would look as follows: 
 
Purpose:  This amendment aims to impose penalties for 
anticompetitive behavior involved with patent litigation 
settlements and the practice of product hopping to limit and 
deter their use. 
 
(a) Definitions 
(1) Product Hopping.  A new version of brand-name drug 
is introduced and subsequently the old version of the 
brand-name drug is withdrawn within eighteen months. 
(b) If a settlement agreement does not comply with the 
regulations for agreements arising from litigation involving 
generic entry under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) or is found to 
have been engaged in anticompetitive product hopping, the 
penalties, in addition to any penalties or injunctions ordered by 
the court, will be as follows: 
(1) any innovator drug, as defined by the Medicaid Drug 
Rebate Program, that is listed in the Medicaid Rebate 
Program involved will have its rebate rate increased from 
23.1% to 100% for six months starting from the date the 
decision is handed down; 
(2) any non-innovator drug, as defined by the Medicaid 
Drug Rebate Program, associated with an innovator drug 
under subsection (a)(1) or involved with the 
anticompetitive behavior under section (a) in the Medicaid 
Rebate Program will have its rebate rates increased from 
13% to 19.5% for six months starting from the date the 
decision is handed down; 
                                                
to the level of antitrust scrutiny when the amount of value transferred exceeds to 
approximate cost of litigation.  F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). 
234 See supra Part II.C (discussing drug product selection laws and their effects on brand-
name and generic drugs). 
235 See CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 230 (explaining the rebate 
rates for innovator drugs and their authorized generic counterparts). 
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(A) if a non-innovator drug under subsection (a)(2) 
has not entered the market at the time the decision is 
handed down, the six-month period of the Medicaid 
Drug Rebate Program rebate rate increase will 
commence upon said drug’s entry into the market.236 
B. Commentary 
The intent behind these amendments is to deter and limit the 
anticompetitive behavior that is typically seen with pay-for-delay 
agreements and product hopping.237  Restricting the length of pay-for-
delay agreements will ensure that generic competition enters, if it is ever 
going to, the market at the earliest possible date and also aligns with the 
thirty-month stay already mandated by the statute.238  The restriction on 
the amount of value that can be transferred from one party to another 
accepts the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Actavis, Inc. that settlement 
agreements from patent litigation that transfer more value than the 
estimated cost of litigation trigger antitrust scrutiny.239  The combination 
of these restrictions aligns with public policy concerns.240  By outlining the 
acceptable terms of settlement agreements of these types, future plaintiffs 
will have clarity as to what they need to sufficiently allege when filing a 
complaint in a suit involving an anticompetitive settlement agreement, 
which makes it easier to survive a motion for summary judgment.241  By 
making it easier to survive a motion for summary judgment, challenges to 
                                                
236 The Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rebate rate increase for innovator drugs from 
23.1% of AMP to 100% AMP was chosen because it is the maximum rebate rate allowed by 
the program.  CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 230.  The six-month 
period of rebate rate increase was chosen to mimic the 180-day exclusivity period granted 
for successful first filers of abbreviated new drug applications.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(aa).  The Medicaid Drug Rebate Program rebate increase for non-
innovator drugs from 13% to 19.5% was chosen because it is a 50% increase of the original 
rebate rate.  CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 230. 
237 See supra Part II (showing the history of anticompetitive behavior associated with pay-
for-delay agreements and product hopping). 
238 See supra Section IV.A.1 (proposing a restriction to the length of settlement agreements). 
239 See supra Section IV.A.1 (detailing the proposed restriction to the transfer of value 
involved with settlement agreements). 
240 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 540 (S.D. 
Ga. 2014) (presenting that one must follow court rules to attempt to conserve court 
resources). 
241 See supra Section IV.A.1 (showing the proposed limitations on settlement agreements 
from patent litigation); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (stating that plaintiff must support a motion 
to dismiss by showing that the records cited to “do not establish the absence or presence of 
a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 
the fact”). 
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anticompetitive behavior will be encouraged.242  The combination of 
restrictions also lends clarity to the courts by defining the line between 
competitive and anticompetitive settlement agreements.243  This clarity 
will help avoid a circuit split that could result in circular lawsuits, which 
is a public policy concern.244 
The penalties that are levied for anticompetitive behavior are 
intended to deter drug companies from practicing anticompetitive 
measures while supplementing an important government program.245  
Penalties not only punish the unwanted behavior but also further the 
public policy of maintaining public health by significantly lowering the 
cost of medication for Medicaid on certain drugs.246 
One could argue that the proposed amendments are an unfair 
restriction on trade and the rights of a patent holder.247  While it is true 
that they can be seen this way, these restrictions do not completely 
eliminate settlement agreements but simply set boundaries necessary to 
foster competition.248  They also do not prevent the transition from an old 
drug to a newer version.249  The effect of the restrictions is outlining what 
is to be considered acceptable, competitive behavior involving settlement 
agreements and product hopping and ensuring that anticompetitive 
behavior involving those areas is deterred and limited.250 
Another counterargument is that if drug companies have found a way 
to game the system and circumvent legislation before, what is preventing 
them from doing it again?251  Even though drug companies have 
continued to find ways to sidestep regulations, it is important to ensure 
                                                
242 See Bona, supra note 163 (detailing the steps and various costs involved with each step 
of antitrust litigation). 
243 See supra Section IV.A.1 (explaining the proposed restrictions on settlement agreements 
resulting from patent litigation). 
244 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Hernandez, 297 F.R.D. at 540. 
245 See supra Section IV.A.2 (outlining the proposed amendments that punish 
anticompetitive behavior involving pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping). 
246 See supra Section IV.A.2 (demonstrating the proposed amendment that imposes 
penalties for the anticompetitive behavior of pay-for-delay agreements and product 
hopping). 
247 See supra Part IV.A (reviewing the proposed amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
248 See supra Section IV.A.1 (expounding upon the proposed amendment to the Hatch-
Waxman Act).  Contra FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that it is the belief of 
the FTC that all pay-for-delay agreements are anticompetitive). 
249 See supra Section IV.A.2 (considering the proposed amendment to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act). 
250 See supra Part IV.A (presenting the proposed amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
251 See supra Part II (chronicling the legal background of pay-for-delay agreements and 
product hopping). 
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that the behavior does not go unchecked.252  The issue of anticompetitive 
pay-for-delay agreements and anticompetitive product hopping 
negatively affects public policy by producing a large amount of cases in 
the court system and affecting the ability to maintain public health.253  The 
restrictions and penalties proposed by this Note seek to win back some 
ground on these public policy concerns.254 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced.  The Hatch-Waxman 
Act, among other things, created a new avenue for generic drug 
companies to challenge brand-name patents, known as Paragraph IV 
Certification.  When a generic drug company files for Paragraph IV 
Certification, the brand-name drug companies can sue the filer for patent 
infringement in what is known as Paragraph IV patent litigation, which 
triggers an automatic thirty-month stay of approval by the FDA.  The 
settlement agreements that resulted from this type of litigation gave rise 
to the anticompetitive practices of pay-for-delay agreements, in which a 
patent holder pays a generic to stay out of its market, and product 
hopping, where a patent holder produces and patents a new version of a 
drug with only minor improvements in an attempt to avoid the 
approaching expiration date of its drug patent. 
The Supreme Court ruled on pay-for-delay agreements in FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., holding that these agreements could rise to the level of 
antitrust scrutiny when the cash payment involved exceeds the 
approximate cost of litigation.  This decision led to the Third Circuit, in In 
re Loestrin, in addition to a host of other courts around the country, 
extending the decision in Actavis, Inc. to cover pay-for-delay agreements 
involving indirect cash payments.  Then, the Second Circuit was the first 
to rule that product hopping could be anticompetitive and violate 
antitrust law in Actavis PLC. 
All of the continued litigation has exposed gaps in the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.  These gaps present the need for amendments to the current 
legislation that deals specifically with deterring and limiting 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping.  This 
Note proposes amendments to the current version of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act that would implement a cap system that restricts pay-for-delay 
agreements and create penalties in the form of increased Medicaid drug 
                                                
252 See supra Part II (articulating the history of pay-for-delay agreements and product 
hopping, which shows how pharmaceutical companies have always found a way to get 
around regulations and court rulings). 
253 See supra SUP. CT. R. 10 (2012); Part II. 
254 See supra Part IV.A (proposing amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
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rebate rates involved with the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program for 
anticompetitive behavior involving pay-for-delay agreements and 
product hopping.  While there are several different counterarguments to 
the proposed amendments, such as violation of patent rights, the 
unnecessary restriction of trade, and the pharmaceutical industry’s ability 
to game the system, the need for amendments that deal with 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay agreements and product hopping is still 
clear because pharmaceutical companies continue to game the system.  
Their track record shows that they will continue. 
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